# 1AC---Round 4---Dartmouth RR

## Stability---1AC

#### Advantage 1---STABILITY:

#### Trilateral Arctic instability collapses nuclear deterrence AND motivates preemptive escalation.

Rempe ’23

climate leading to a thawing of conflicts China’s interests must be considered as a regional actor Russia threatened to use nuc s sets a precedent for nuclear tension which has seen a buildup factors have led to tensions between NATO China and Russia cannot be explained by deterrence models nuclear deterrence relies on two rational actors This game does not contend with multiple actors a key feature of Arctic security multipolarity is unstable because it no longer falls within game theory increased risk of nuclear action due to number of actors and tension Preemptive strikes are more prevalent due to perception America’s NFU is vague conflicts likely to escalate into total warfare future disputes give rise to nuclear crises Climate change inflamed tensions region may become a nuclear flashpoint

#### Russian and Chinese presence creates a ‘Polar Trap,’ triggering great power war.

Burke ‘21

Whereas the U S stands as the hegemon activities by China and Russia in polar regions contribute to the Thucydides Trap the likely result is war 12 of the 16 cases resulted in war there is empirical validity that provides utility in a lesser-known region The Trap is illustrative of a security dilemma when a ruling power confronts a rising power there are similarities to the polar regions tensions stemming from presence producing conditions for confrontation burgeoning entitlement demand for influence coupled with insecurity 75 percent of cases resulted in war

#### Specifically, Russia cuts undersea cables to gain the information advantage.

Glanz ’20

incident offer another clue to ambitions and how they leverage Arctic power to choke off communication sub can dive to endless miles cables that carry internet Putin stressed the importance of controlling information Moscow does not want conflict with NATO it does not have resources Russia would do anything to maintain information superiority disrupting seabed cables would fit the objective seabed cables carry communications are largely unprotected and easy to find analysts have dismissed the danger But simply degrading the network could be enough

#### Cable disruption is existential.

Bennett ’19

worst case can delete wavelengths and disrupt global Internet This is all too realistic effects could obviously be severe if power or water were interrupted networks rely on undersea cables for food and medical connectivity relies on cables stretching thousands of miles internet cables being attacked by Russia to limit communication fabric of society stretch attack under the ocean could lead to this discord on a larger scale

#### Escalation is likely---the proximity of Russia’s retaliatory force motivates early nuclear use.

Klare ’20

Finnmark become most likely for first use in any Russian conflict Moscow has concentrated its retaliatory capability on Kola success would endanger arsenal and precipitate early use the sole access to the Atlantic is Murmansk headquarters for Northern Fleet among the most sensitive regions today nuclear subs are assigned to the Fleet with as 500 warheads such sub s are the most survivable can disappear into the Atlantic the possibility of deterring a strike hinges on Murmansk nuclear forces would be placed on high alert Any misstep lead to apocalypse the Arctic could spark Armageddon

#### The confluence of arsenal build-up, tech development, and first-use doctrines guarantee war.

Juntunen ’19

Russia ambitions will increase efforts to reinforce the Kola Peninsula there are signs of hostile signalling in the region key concerns is arsenal of nuc s projects introduce new non-​strategic capabilities These development point towards concern over stability deepen the cycle of mistrust nuclear buildup will increase assertiveness in relation to t n w s and dual-​capable deployments around the area worrisome developments has been the revival of escalation control in the discussion on limited strikes increasing accuracy and developments in sensing making forces more vulnerable These developments undermine deterrence increase the attractiveness of first strikes permissive’ language on first use makes changes in the strategic balance worrying intensifying power rivalry further erode separation of nuclear and conventional weapons

#### Threats to the Barents bastion independently collapse stability.

Regehr ’23

Threats to deterrent forces are a egregious way operations are destabilizing Barents is a bastion within which forces operate Kola rely on Barents for mustering forces and the primary zone for SSBNs key mission to provide a guaranteed second-strike objectives mean it has a interest in building up defence Russia expected to dominate its vicinity and establish a perimeter Barents Kara and White Seas become a zone for operations retains a interest in a zone where its retaliatory forces will not be threatened

#### Only US-Russia war causes extinction.

Farquhar ’17

nuc war between the U S and Russia send smoke into the atmosphere which cause cooling ozone loss and ag disruption exchange could drop temperatures around 8°C making it impossible to grow food survivors would be in a precarious situation and threat from other sources would be great An exchange is only possible between US and Russia regional nuclear war are unlikely to lead to extinction risk is plausibly greater from U S and Russia

#### Nuclear threats in the Arctic lack credibility but prevent effective security cooperation.

Dallaire ’14

National interests clash in the Arctic unless we put in place c b m s The obstacle is that the region serve as a arena in the U.S.-Russian standoff routinely conduct patrols there nations have nuclear-capable aircraft Russia attaches importance to the Northern Fleet as its most important asset five states subscribe to The deterrent provided by NATO counterproductive to co-operative security We see a change concerning the credibility of nuc s Deploying and using in the Arctic have little credibility and will seem repugnant to future generations

#### Arctic conflict cannot be contained---aggressive postures cause unintentional escalation but restraint solves.

Rumer ’21

Mutual accusations risk becoming a prophecy situation is the classic security dilemma commitment of NATO and Russia’s vision of requirements meet along the northern flank conflict would not be confined and would prove catastrophic escalation risk increase as forces operate in close proximity difficult to see past statements about plans ambitions far exceed resources it has to realize them confrontation is not new and the push for resources is crucial for its posture Russia is playing defense Its economy is stagnant population declining and it is isolated among the Arctic states pursuits will be driven by concerns about its weakened position the U S should adopt diplomacy and deterrence arrangements to mitigate the risks of miscalculation defensive improvements discourage harassing aircraft and ships and ensure reinforcement plans posture of restraint signal it does not intend offensive operations

#### Externally, accidents with Russia and China escalate, clear signaling is key to prevent war.

Cusick ’24

posturing by Russia and China is raising red flags Russia is working with China to build infrastructure warships sailed through the Bering Strait conducting anti-submarine and aircraft exercises tensions rise over encroachment The risk is a busier Arctic increased competition between Russia the U.S. and China presence of military and commercial actors increases the risk of accidents that spill over into conflicts It’s important to not create a prophecy We should make signals we’re sending are not ones where we want the Arctic as a place to fight over

## Relations---1AC

#### Advantage 2---RELATIONS:

#### Military tensions collapse Arctic cooperation with Russia---that prevents science diplomacy and closes the Arctic Ocean.

Limas-Villers ’22

After Ukraine the community severed cooperation Arctic proved to be no exception cooperation remains crucial Council facilitated dialogue creating agreements on scientific cooperation geopolitical tensions escalated before the boycott Russia has pursued the N S R the U.S. reactivated the Second Fleet militarized Arctic would be detrimental to interests it would worsen relations with Russia threaten an arms race militarizing gives China and Russia a cause to pursue a sphere of influence tensions encourage Putin to build ties making it difficult to separate in the long term excluding Russia from cooperation can reverse progress within the Arctic Council the U S would be best served by encouraging cooperation to provide access to the Ocean preserve the environment

#### Effective science diplomacy dampens existential threats.

Haynes ’18

progress rests on cooperation human enterprises will be necessary science and diplomacy focus is to solve problems collaboratively agreements such as Paris and Iran science diplomacy is issues of tomorrow 1 billion may be displaced disasters increase in frequency and intensity solutions will be underpinned by science and ability to collaborate the Arctic has been shrinking how this is managed will determine ecosystems the Council is the most examples of science diplomacy agreements have facilitated cooperation on search and rescue pollution data sharing and research expertise will be in demand across bio gene-editing agriculture trade currencies a i giving rise to authoritarianism The future civilization depends on it

#### Restricting Arctic Circle openness sets a global precedent against maritime stability.

Regehr ’23

Arctic FON are an example of spillover from disputes elsewhere Worried about attempts to claim territorial waters in the S C S and Hormuz the US is bent on having the Passage recognized as international to prevent precedent that restrict operations elsewhere Navy operate across the Region to keep seas free and open interests includes a need to ensure an open Arctic by continuing f o n the interest is the principle in all areas

#### Extinction.

Singh ’22

maritime domain shaped destiny of world commons are under stress robust mechanism is imperative With depletion of resources seas are becoming future of humankind order is the key to protecting resource UNCLOS adherence stood the test of time mitigating tensions and improved cooperative approach gunboat diplomacy blockades provoke escalation Tackling existential challenge by climate change or Economy cables are under threat piracy insurgencies spreading terrorism present fishing stocks depleting acidification on rise 90 per cent of trade transits on ships security of SLOCs only possible with collective approach threat comes from nations seeking to reshape existing order staking illegal claims to commons freedom of seas can be single most unifying factor or disruptor UNCLOS has been effective Had China’s reclamation been nipped brazenness may have been curbed

#### Regional misalignment collapses environmental protections.

Pamuk ’23

For decades Russia U S have cooperated on climate and development the body's viability is at risk An ineffective Council could have dire implications for environment work has produced agreements on protection with the end of cooperation projects are on hold new projects cannot go ahead scientists no longer share findings cooperation for oil spills has stopped We need to safeguard the Council will eventually need to reengage with Russia

#### Ecological disruptions cascade globally---extinction.

Carmack ’19

the Arctic is critical to survival its impact on system is disproportionately large. it scoops up runoff the Arctic is the driver of the global conveyor belt Gulf and Atlantic Current are regulated in the Arctic the hydrological cycle determines water around the planet and affects security globally it also drives disruptions the Arctic is a freight train that influences the global climate system

#### Strong U.S.-Russian relations are necessary for climate research.

Øvretveit ’23

Arctic transformation unprecedented temp increase three times faster Arctic Amplification influence climate and global ocean pivotal role in understanding climate Russia halt coop major negative consequences IPCC decisions losing vital data weaken policy difficult to understand emissions melting without field work methane black carbon mitigation goals during Russian chairmanship methane a field Russian scientists have high expertise proximity gives advantage Atlantification Warming effects on marine ecosystems data needed in Russian waters

#### Climate change is existential.

Andrei ’22

climate change is an existential threat create a domino effect that ripples climate change makes areas unlivable this could translate into unrest, war, and catastrophic, even at modest levels Climate has played a role in every mass extinction Paths are not limited to direct impacts financial crises, conflict, and disease could trigger other calamities and nuclear war

#### First use is the critical barrier to relations---NFU is both necessary and sufficient to defrost tensions.

Axworthy ’10

n f u is essential first use does not fit with partnership between NATO and Russia This will require changes to American policies declare that the purpose is to deter the use of nuc s this is important for lessening tensions renunciation of first use in the Arctic region does not countries will no longer be under the umbrella or uphold obligations States have an obligation to provide assistance but this cannot include nuclear devices The conventional superiority ensures that deterrence will persist

#### The plan’s declaration solidifies a sustainable foundation for predictable relations AND reduces tensions.

MacDonald ’21

ANWFZ have yet to be viable The problem lies in conditions that must be present states must have mutual confidence there is the need to insulate cooperation while recognizing security issues c b m s are necessary to Arctic denuclearization declarations can act as foundation for the building of predictable relations agreements create a milieu in which you preserve stability prospects for progress under Biden were the possibility of a n f u Such a change would have ramifications on activity in the Arctic it would remove threat Russian SSBNs n f u pledge is a key measure

#### Defense diplomacy resolves regional security concerns while smoothing over relations.

Bouffard ’20

the Arctic Council was appropriate for non-military issues security are heightening and a stable region may be facing headwinds the Arctic host to a security dilemma there is no forum for defence discussions would not be easy in the contemporary environment what is missing is a dialogue between Russia regarding national security defence forum should not involve NATO involvement could detract from the Arctic nature the forum must be sovereign equals which alliance would complicate The Arctic have resources as well as experience managing tensions the Arctic is an exceptional case diplomacy involves military channels to create trust and convergence of interests most concerning centers on military buildup the U S and NATO will increase presence and without dialogue misunderstanding will likely worsen Other issues involve maritime law discourse can leverage toward diplomacy The Council tackle environmental and scientific research A gap is one that addresses security military diplomacy leading to understanding as well as prevention of conflict

## Plan---1AC

#### The United States should adopt a policy of not using nuclear weapons first within the Arctic Circle.

## Extra---1AC

#### It's impossible to defend---Arctic operations and deterrence aren’t credible.

Kehrt’ 1/18

U.S. highlighted importance of Arctic But has done little to invest or build capacity needed to sustain forces We don’t have infrastructure know-how institutional knowledge comm systems and sustained presence and training lofty visions don’t match realities the U.S. has two icebreakers Russia’s 45 icebreakers are necessary not sufficient Chief are domain awareness and operational readiness the U S has neither Everything breaks Fuels lubricants batteries materials shatter everything is iced over Pentagon’s infrastructure is built on permafrost melting Russia has substantial presence better poised to respond

#### Allies don’t fear kinetic action---they view Russian defensively countering US attack routes.

Allers ’21

Western nations are struggling to balance cooperation with deterrence countries find themselves in uncomfortable position, squeezed between U S effort to coopt them into debates on how to develop measured strategies extend to NATO Arctic importance is due to perception in Moscow it is a route for a US attack most elements of buildup ar predominantly defensive anti-access area denial radar and barracks If Western countries view Russia’s buildup with concern, it is not because they perceive a direct threat of kinetic actions Western experts and officials acknowledge Russia’s buildup is defensive They do not foresee conflict in the Arctic. They see expansion elsewhere

**2AC---Round 4---Dartmouth RR**

**T---NFU**

**T---NFU---2AC**

**Contextually, it’s a ‘no first use policy.’**

**Axworthy ’10**

A **n** **f** **u** **policy** is an essential **Arctic NWFZ Treaty** This require changes to **American** **policies** the **U** **S** has a policy of **first use** **use nuc** **s** **only parts** of **Nuclear-Weapon States** will be **covered** by the Treaty **U** **S** **remaining nuc** **s**

**Counter-interpretation---‘no first use’ can be narrowed to geographic regions.**

**Ullman ’72**

"**n** **f** **u** **one or more** might be **unilateral** **or** confined to a **specified geographic region** **adopt** **n** **f** **u** **policy** in **multilateral** **bilateral** agreement if **only one party** made **commitment** **n** **f** **u** declaration will **give B** assurance that **A will not strike** Whether **unilaterally** or by **agreement**, the **consequences** for **nations** are **exactly the same**, for "no first use" **not depend** **self-enforcing** **no first use** **prospect** **retaliation**

**Reasonability---there’s no consensus. They arbitrarily race to the bottom.**

**Goldblat ’84**

The **choice of policy** is **not** between **pure and simple** ’**no-first-use**’ **other options** A **no-first-use posture** can be made **conditional** when **other things** have been done it **often is** **conditional** on conventional capacity The **S** **A** **C** **welcomed** this

**T---NFU---AT: Policy---2AC**

**‘Policy’ is just action by government.**

**Oxford ’23**

course of **action** adopted **or proposed** by **government, party, business, or individual.**

**CP---Adv**

**Adv CP---2AC**

**A strong Arctic alliance lets China collapse the international order.**

**Buitrago ’19**

China is increasing **cooperation** with Russia on **Arctic matters** Intensifying **Chinese-Russian** **aligning** particularly worries decision makers with the possibility of **China and Russia** challenging the **global order** China **act cooperatively** and avoid tension closer **cooperation** enables China to **exert influence** China will use its influence **wherever possible** with increased **confrontation** It becomes **essential** to deal with **China in the Arctic** **stability**

**Liberal internationalism solves every transnational threat.**

**Ikenberry ’20**

**U** **S** **others** If **U** **S** abandons role **competition** would destroy institutions democracies would descend **in** **disunion** lose ability to shape **global rules** **norms** partners threatened by **Climate change** **pandemic diseases**, **financial crises**, **failed states** **nuclear proliferation** **automation** **a** **i** other **unimagined upheavals**

**bet** **integrate** **responsible** **failed**

Despite **faults**, no other **organizing principle** comes **close** to liberal **internationalism** in **cooperative world** **encourages** **self-determination** **rights** **economic security**, and **rule of law** **flaws** are inherent in **all political orders** What is **unique** about liberal order is its **capacity** for **self-correction** **shortcomings** pale in comparison to **achievements** **economic growth** **rising incomes** **any other order** **societies**

**DA---Conventional Shift**

**Conventional Shift DA---2AC**

**CPS development inevitable---US has plans ingrained for the next 5 years.**

**Katz ‘23**

**production schedule** **3.6 billion** for **64 rounds** over **next five years** **C** **P** **S** **upcoming** **jointly developed** **Navy** employ **Zumwalt-class destroyers** and **Virginia-class submarines** **Army** **land-based variant**

**341 million**

**440 million** **663 million** **988 million** **1.1 billion**

plans to **integrate** CPS **destroyers** **submarines** we have **confidence** we’re able to **field** system **Air Force** **research** **development** **Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon** **24** **Air Force** **Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile** continue **research** and **development** through **28**

**They’re globally inevitable and the US is invested now.**

**Varilek ‘19**

**U** **S** **China** **Russia** are **hypersonic** the farthest along India Japan Australia E U are in various stages **pursing hypersonic** **interest** congressional budget allocated funds to **all three** service components **hypersonic**

**Winning the case disproves the link.**

**Sethi ’18**

Would a decision that bans **first use** **nuc** **s** lead to **arms race** conventional armament there are **no empirical studies** trend is **unlikely** if results in **cooperative** **relations** modernization **subside**

**Restoring the firebreak solves the impact.**

**Tannenwald ’18**

tech risk **blurring the line** between nuc and conventional the distinction is the **qualitative restraint** on using the bomb leaders **recognized** this distinction as the **firebreak** **nuc** **war** **hypersonic** **under development** **p** **g** **s** **p** **g** **s** encourage **mistaken perception** **removal of threats** of nuclear first strike strengthen **crisis stability** make **absolute** the **boundary**

**No hypersonics impact---physics and maneuverability get in the way.**

**Kunertova ’22**

**hypersonic** **s** **hype** **exaggerates** **Hypersonic** **s** yet to reach **maturity** **boost-glide** **air-breathing** Countries are yet to overcome **thermal** **aerodynamic obstacles** **politicized** **hypersonic** **s** **too agile** Reportedly, Russia deployed **Avangard** China **DF-ZF** yet **no** **power** expected to field **any significant number** **hypersonic** **s** hypersonics **extreme speed** **maneuverability** is **crucial factor** new gliders **maneuver less** in midcourse than **expected** of maneuverable weapon advantage to **traditional MARVs** is **unclear** **hypersonic** **s** **niche capability** **unrealistic** to anticipate **national arsenals** of hypersonic s

**No first use is key to transition to non-nuclear hypersonics, anything else voids strategic benefits OR collapses stability.**

**Russell ’21**

**<<DARTMOUTH CARD ENDS>>**

deployments would be underpinned by **declaration** of a **NFU policy** enhancing **strategic stability** this **major step forward** could buy normative currency to **outweigh the loss incurred** Russia introduced **Avangard** without major ramifications **stability** widespread **deployment** is **inevitable** the **U** **S** may be facing a **limited window of opportunity** in which to incorporate these systems

**DA---SLCM-N**

**SLCM-N DA---2AC**

**SLCM-N’s already funded.**

**Burack ’24**

**House Republicans** succeeded in establishing the **SLCM-N** over **Biden** **SLCM-N**

**No link. Nuclear policy doesn’t require Congress. Doesn’t require horse-trading.**

**Collina ’21**

**Biden** has to set **strict priorities** for its agenda there’s one issue on which Biden can make progress **without arm-twisting** **nuclear war** **New START** **nuclear policy** **NPR**

**avoid fights**

Biden’s can set nuclear policies using extensive **executive authority**. Presidents enjoy greater control over nuclear policy than **any other area**

**limit**

**The U** **S**

Biden has the power without **undermining** his **crucial** **congressional agenda**

**Link is zero their ev is about arms control, not NFU or declaratory statements.**

**Soofer 23**

The White House and Congress **disagree** over the **type** and **number of nuclear weapons required** to **deter** **adversaries** a **bargain** is available Biden canceled the SLCM-N) **But** **responsibly** **a set policy of no new US nuclear capabilities or no expansion of US strategic nuclear forces, then Russia has no reason to come to the negotiating table. A big incentive for Moscow to negotiate is if it fears the United States will build up its own nuclear arsenal. Just as important, an arms control approach that does not include some augmented nuclear capabilities will be a non-starter for Republicans and some Democrats on Capitol Hill. A bargain is required**. **Biden administration could, for example, agree to develop the SLCM-N In exchange, congressional Republicans could lend public support to the administration’s efforts** **to secure a post–New START follow-on arms control framework or agreement**

**SLCMs inevitable AND non-escalatory**

**Geller ’21**

**SLCM-N** **not** destabilizing **Russia** **China** confuse **conventional** with **nuclear** logic **fundamentally flawed** **non-unique** to **SLCM-N** **any** system can carry **nuclear payload** Countries have **dual-capable** for **years** **mistaken** escalation **never** occurred **Russia** **Syria** **U** **S** **China** **mistakenly** In **conventional** **nuclear response** after U.S. missile **implausible** Russia China **second-strike** available **preemptively** launch **risking** **not** in interests **SLCM-N** **not** arms race **Russia** **China** **already** expanding **new** systems **Russia deploys** **China** **a** **l** **b** **m** **nuclear** **ground-launched** **i** **r** **b** **m** SLCM-N **modest response** **not** the **cause** **consistently** **U** **S** **not intend** **match** doing **nothing** **ceding** advantage reducing **ability** to **deter**

**The SLCM-N replaces more destabilizing weapons, and new tech innovations solve instability.**

**McKinley ’22**

U.S. currently deployed **low-yield warhead** **the W76-2,** **Trident II D5** **This introduces a discrimination problem** which may force an adversary to strategic force **transition to the proposed SLCM-N** would **alleviate** **discrimination issue** **warhead ambiguity** **clearly demonstrate** a **non-strategic option** **fulfill** **low-yield option** **less destabilizing**

**maximizing the flexibility of options** **maintaining extended deterrence** **imperative** **SLCM-N pursued**

development **SLCM-N** may **include** **measures to help prevent indistinguishability** between it and conventional cruise missiles **to prevent unwarranted escalation**

**K---Nuclearism**

**Nuclearism K---2AC**

**Dismantling the ‘nuclear order’ is existential AND the perm solves.**

**Ulgen ’15**

disarm **dangerous** **more dangerous** **difficult** to identify **credible alternative** **nuclear deterrence** **worked** **m** **a** **d** **continues** to **limiting** confrontations Devoid of **nuclear** **immediately** **more dangerous** **conventional arms races** **unstoppable** **nuclear** deterrent **reductions** **defense spending** **extended nuclear deterrence** **less** **nuclear weapons** **force for stability** **stability** **any means** **nuclear weapons** If world one big “**peace cartel** **fragile** **breaking** **commitments** have **enormous security benefits** **free** **universal regime** **never** **never will** **rogue state** **nuclear** regime **fall apart completely** **single** **noncompliance** cause **own deterrents** **collapse** **cascade** of **proliferation** **difficulty** **transition** **nuclear-free world** Until **threats** that **led** to **nuclear weapons** are **permanently eliminated**, **difficult** to envision **agreeing** disarm **not** to say **disarmament** **abandoned** To **contrary** **U** **S** **move forward** with **reducing** **arsenals** **achieved** **universal commitment** **use** **first** **achievable** **n** **f** **u** risk of **nuclear war** **greatly reduced** **many decades** **Stability** **maintained** if arsenals did **not** reach **zero** **goal** **global nuclear community**

**Symbolically affirming their method despite a lack of institutional and material commitments weakens abolitionist praxis.**

**Rosenberg, 22**

rhetoric **so easily abused** must be **matched** by **institutional** and **material commitments** **not** **simple** **good** **justified reason** **not always rhetorically distinguishable** **concretize** skepticism **institutional arrangements** to **bend institutional defaults** away from militarism it should be **politically**, **socially**, and **logistically difficult** to prosecute a war and we should **organize government agencies**, including **budgets**, to reflect this

**easy** **unchecked institutional default**

This makes rhetoric **fine words scolding the storm** **too easily appropriated** by warmongers as a **partisan cudgel** critiques are too concerned with **ideological rationales** and not enough with **institutional design** and **material interests** . I **doubt very much** we are likely to **radically alter the guiding ideology** of leadership even if we did **institutional inertia alone** could overdetermine a **casually fatal militarism**. Transaction costs are **important deterrent** the **most important** deterrent **only gets us so far** **inevitable** at some point politicians and voters will be enthusiastic about **other bad wars** **how will we stop those**? **fine-tuned adjudication** **currently unavailable** **debates** is run through with **bad faith actors** who lack a **sincere desire** to reduce military action and may convert **political capital accrued through such criticisms** **advancing the interests** of that military **near future**

**Abolition is, even if rhetorically powerful, impossible to achieve. Incremental steps like the plan reduce nuclear risks and are comparatively more effective.**

**Evans 21**

those in the peace movement talk of **but no use at all** argue energy should be directed to Prohibition They reject **halfway measures** **that end point is as far away as it has ever been** Prohibition has emotional appeal **no buy-in whatsoever** from nuclear-armed states Nor will it for the **foreseeable future** reasons are **ideological** **geopolitical** **psychological** **verification** and **enforcement** **incremental** If one wants **real-world progress** **never make the best the enemy of the good** **compromise** **capitulation** priority now direct advocacy not into **elimination**, but **minimization** to **n** **f** **u** **highest priorities**.

**Fiat is good---it positions debaters and judges as budding social critics, while maintaining the format of debate as a game.**

**McGee ’97**

**ACTUALLY** **MAKE BELIEVE ABOUT**

**an audience** **public policy** debaters should understand themselves as **budding social critics** in search of **an optimal practical and cultural politics**. While few will ever hold **a formal policy-making position** **nearly all of us** grow up with **the social and political criticism** Debate **differs** from **other species of social criticism** debate is **a game** played by students who want to win **Social criticism** is not restricted to **technocratic elite** or **group of elected officials** criticism is **a prerequisite** to **policy** whether articulated by **an elected official** or by **a mother of six** **normally implies** Debate **social criticism** does not entail **exclusion** **formal agenda** from **intercollegiate debate**. The specified agent **typical policy resolutions** makes ignoring **the formal agenda** the U S **an impossibility** one need not influence **the formal agenda directly** to discuss what the U S should do. **Undergraduate debaters** and **their judges** are **far removed** from **the arena of formal-agenda deliberation** **Strictly speaking** debaters **the creation of fictions** **compar** fictions to another. How else does one explain **the affirmative advocacy of a plan** that does not exist **traditional inherency burdens** demand **such plans be utopian**, **current attitudes or structures** plans **unlikely** in the “real world” **Intercollegiate debate** is **utopian** because plan and counterplan enactment is **improbable** **incremental and radical policy change proposals** distinction makes **no difference** **the utopian practice** **intercollegiate debate** **intercollegiate debate** **For decades** **intercollegiate debaters** used fiat or “**should**” to propose **radical changes in the social order** **These students already** write **utopian fiction** **their first plan** **counterplan text** **talking about public policy** is **not** making **public policy**

**useful** **social critics** **anything other** **an educational game** **undergraduate students**

**Discussing the global effects of nuclear conflict is valuable.**

**Cordle ’17**

possibility of earth scarred by nuclear “**desolations** **disruption** suggest **vulnerability**, of **humans** **planet** it functions **denying** by **embracing** **shared peril** become opportunity to build **new alliances** and **contest** thinking **endemic** to Cold War **nuclear establishment** potential for **global** war meaning **no-one** was **exempt** from **nuclear fate**, there emerged necessity of thinking how humanity was held in **common** beyond **political** **national** difference. **nuc** **s** pass **beyond** **borders** war as an attack not on **countries** as **planet** on **all people** As species seemed **imperilled** called up **shared** **human identity** we may **disagree** it is nuclear bombs which are the **problem** but they **represent** **innervating** attempt to **challenge** **beyond** **nationalism** **lives** **threatened** **effects** **problematize** **conceptual categories** by which human was **understood** **boundaries** **dissolve** **radiation** **fallout**

**Every component of planet politics is incoherent.**

**Hamilton, 17**

**Anthropocene** **IR** **entangled Anthropocene condition** a **paradigm-shifting transition** away from **states** **enmeshed** **does not replace** **re-conceptualize** **tacitly embraces** **firmly upon Newtonian pillars** **neo-Newtonian** **classical understanding** the Anthropocene is **dependent** upon sciences and linear history **planetary politics** **loses its significance** and **impact** an entangled human/nature hybrid **truly form** **depends upon hierarchical** **classical understandings** of **thin layers of rock** the **human subject** the Anthropocene depends upon simulations combining **physics** with **economic theory** these operate: by **quantifying nature** **small** **discrete variables** which model **direct cause-and-effect explanations** **project nature outwards** through **neo-Newtonian metaphysics** **calculable coherence** **epistemologically** **ontologically incongruous** **mind-boggling way** **so uniformly** **barely even notice it** Declaring nature to be “entangled” **does not actually make them so**. It **masks the certainty** Newtonian causality One **cannot overcome** Western metaphysics by **reading** about how to then **asserting it to be so** This **intensifies** treat entanglement as a **concept** **tool** **object** **causally applied** to a human subject **replicates** **background context** **contrasted** **secure** **implicit human/nature dualism** **violent act** **masking a neo-Newtonian ordering** **inherent** If we were **actually entangled**, not only should there be **no boundaries**, but it would be **impossible to detect them** **replace** **transcend** **interdependence** **interconnection** **IR’s security discourses**

# 1AR---Round 4---Dartmouth RR

## T---NFU

### T---NFU---1AR

#### No limits explosion---we already have an NFU for over 180 countries.

**UCS ’20**

**current policy** **U** **S** **not use nuc** **s** **vast majority** **any circumstances** **N** **P** **R** **non-nuclear weapons states** **NPT** **more** **180countries**

**U** **S** **already** **no-first-use policy** **vast majority** **without nuc** **s**

## K---Nuclearism

### Nuclearism K---1AR

#### NFU is a necessary first step.

**Egeland 21**

In the short term, the TPNW is likely to continue to grow its support base among non- nuclear-weapon states. While it is clear that advocates have a monumental task ahead of them, with every additional signature and ratification, the balance shifts in favour of adherence, increasing the pressure on holdouts. Perceptive observers have already noticed changes to the way in which erstwhile critics represent the Treaty (Sauer and Nardon 2020). “In a subtle diplomatic move”, notes former Canadian ambassador Doug Roche (2020), “the Government of Canada has ceased its opposition and now ‘acknowledges’ the reason for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.” Belgium, another formerly ardent opponent of the TPNW, is now governed on the basis of a policy platform that calls on Belgium to “explore how to strengthen the multilateral non-proliferation framework and how the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons can give new impetus to multilateral nuclear disarmament” (ICAN 2020). The Norwegian Labour Party, the largest party in the Norwegian Parliament, has since 2017 gradually shifted from a position of guarded opposition to the TPNW to one of cautious support. At its conference in April 2021, the party resolved that signature of the TPNW was impossible in the short term but “should be a goal for Norway and other NATO members” (Arbeiderpartiet 2021).While the overall effect of the agreement remains to be seen, the TPNW has the potential to effect change in multiple ways. First and most immediately, the positive obligations enshrined in the agreement, such as the duties to assist victims and provide environmental remediation, could yield help to affected communities. Further, the provisions for nuclear disarmament verification is already fostering innovative thinking among experts (see Patton, Philippe, and Mian 2019; Shea 2019). While nuclear dis-armament verification work carried out under the auspices of certain nuclear-armed states has occasionally been tainted by the suspicion that the activities in question are being promoted primarily as a fig leaf for inaction (see Perkovich 2020, 18; Varriale 2020, 19–19), verification work carried out in support of the TPNW might steer clear of such suspicions. Second, the TPNW and the norms it codifies could serve as the lynchpin of an alternative nuclear politics – a new nuclear “common sense” – that might over time nudge hearts and minds to financially and ideologically divesting from nuclear arms. In the words of the UN Secretary-General, the TPNW could provide a tool for generating “useful pressure for effective, positive measures in disarmament” (Guterres 2018). Nuclear policy pundits often take for granted that policy change will inevitably have to take place through persuasion – that those currently opposed to this or that disarmament measure will have to be brought over to the other side through polite, elite-level consultations and rational argumentation. But such “Habermasian” conversion is rare in real life – certainly among high-level politicians. As Max Planck put it with regards to scientific paradigm shifts, a new paradigm “does not triumph by convincing its oppo-nents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it” (Planck 1950, 33–34). In the case of nuclear diplomacy, there is also the added complication that the key interlocutors – diplomats – act not as autonomous subjects but as representatives of complex organisa-tions and vested interests. The TPNW, in this view, is unlikely to bring about change by altering the minds of current diplomats and politicians. But it might contribute to over time shaping wider narratives and understandings and, by extension, the worldviews of future politicians, strategists, voters, and activists. As discussed above, a key contribution of the TPNW is to create room for adversarial politics, democracy, and ethical clarity – to draw away the abolitionist “veil of good intentions” and reveal the fault lines under-pinning the global nuclear order (see Ruzicka 2018).Third, the TPNW could weigh in more directly in existing debates on nuclear policy as a rhetorical asset and source of pressure. An interesting case in point is Barack Obama’s deputy national security advisor, Ben Rhodes, who after leaving office praised the 112K. EGELAND International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), the civil society coalition championing the TPNW. Alluding that outside pressure plays a crucial role in shaping discussions inside governments, Rhodes argued in 2019 that it was important to hold nuclear-armed leaders’ “feet to the fire”. After all, states are not unitary actors of a single mind, but arenas for political contestation and discussion. In these tugs of war, opposing factions naturally use the rhetorical resources that are available to them, including external pressures and arguments. And the pressure from disarmers, Rhodes implied, was not nearly strong enough. As the former official argued,the other side of these debates – the people who manufacture the weapons, the people who might want to use the weapons, the people who unfortunately are in power in too many places – they’re very well coordinated, they’re very well-funded, they share common strategies; we know that. And what they’re counting on is your apathy, your cynicism, your sense that there’s nothing I can do about this – that I can’t deal with the scale of change that needs to take place. Once you succumb to that, they win (Rhodes 2019). Given the mighty opposition of the defence industry and other vested interests, it was crucial, Rhodes suggested, to amplify pressure for disarmament through “visionary organisations like ICAN”. While Rhodes might not have admitted it while in office, the endorsement by US allies and other non-nuclear-weapon states of the TPNW could help progressives within the US government make their case for American nuclear restraint, including a no-first-use or sole-purpose policy, by widening the so-called Overton window or perceived scope for political action. After all, at present, the case for a large US arsenal and first-use nuclear posture turns largely on the claim that America’s allies and partners would not have it any other way. Ultimately, the impact of the TPNW will be determined by its stakeholders. For its supporters, the entry-